Employment protection reforms in South America : effective instruments to manage employment? by University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies et al.
IDRO Lib. 
FC1996-1 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION REFORMS 
IN SOUTH AMERICA: 
EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENTS 
TO MANAGE EMPLOYMENT? 
by 
Adriana Marshall1 
Centre for International Studies 





Not to be reprinted without the permission of the author. 
Copyright 1996 
National Research Council (CONICET). Mailing address: Beruti 2306, Suite 9B, (1117) Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. 




EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION REFORMS IN SOUTH AMERICA: 
EFFECTiVE INSTRUMENTS TO MANAGE EMPLOYMENT?* 
Adriana Marshall** 
January 1996 
* This paper was partly written while the author was at the Centre for International Studies 
(CIS), University of Toronto, and is based on research supported by a CIS award. 
** Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones CientIficas y Técnicas-Instituto de Desarrollo 
Económico y Social, Buenos Aires. 
At the turn of the 1980s and during the early 1990s a number of Latin American 
countries reformed their legal systems of labour protection for private sector workers. Several 
of these reforms were addressed to the employment protection regime. The mechanisms of wage 
determination and collective labour rights were also revised in some countries. At the same time, 
the "state reforms" redefined the scope of state intervention, and therefore the size, composition 
and labour market role of public-sector employment, as well as the legal regulation of state 
employment. 
In Argentina (1991), Colombia (1990), Ecuador (1991) and Peru (1991), for instance, 
forms of "flexibilization" of the employment contract and reforms to the legal protection of 
unfair and/or collective dismissal were implemented. In Brazil (1988), Chile (1990-91) and 
Venezuela (1990), by contrast, some aspects of labour legislation were modified with a view at 
enhancing employment protection. Other Latin American countries, such as Mexico and 
Uruguay, did not join in this process of labour law reform, but introduced some changes in 
labour protection through collective agreements. 
After more than a decade of intense dispute, the debate on the impact of employment 
protection regimes1 on the labour market has not yet been settled. In relation to the employment 
level, it was not possible to demonstrate as yet neither that stronger protection against job loss 
and limitations to flexible contracts lead to less employment creation in the long run nor the 
opposite. Contradictory findings, unable to provide unshakeable support to anyone of the 
opposite positions, piled with the mounting empirical evidence.2 It was clearly shown, by 
Buechtemann (1993) among others, that the problem is much more complex than the usual 
simplifications posited on both sides,3 that the effects of employment protection vary according 
to social and economic circumstances, and that the many institutions that contribute to 
employment protection, apart from laws, play a role in determining labour market outcomes. 
Evidence showed, however, how institutional regulation does effectively structure the labour 
Throughout this paper, protection' is used very loosely to refer to the legal institutions that 
place barriers to the free utilization of individual and collective dismissals and of un- or less protected 
employment contracts; as explained below, unemployment insurance and assistance schemes are considered as 
well, in spite of the fact that they do not protect employment but income (on the latter distinction, as well as on 
the meanings of employment security, see Buechtemann, 1993). 
2 This evidence is reviewed in detail by Buechtemann (1993). 
For a detailed account of the diverse employment effects attributed to job security see e.g. Emerson (1988) 
and Buechtemann (1993). 
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market. The legal regime of employment protection (consisting of a whole set of institutions, 
that vary across countries) does have an incidence on employer and worker behaviour, and this 
is reflected by the structure of the labour force, but not necessarily by the global employment 
and unemployment rates and trends. In other words, the imposition of institutional restrictions 
on the managerial prerogative to "adjust" the workforce to changing business conditions, as well 
as their degree of stringency, influence the structure of the labour force, both employed and 
unemployed. The fact that unconstrained dismissal plays a disciplinary role in relation to 
employed workers, even if not expressed in actually higher lay-off rates in those countries where 
employers are freer to dismiss,4 was also highlighted. 
As for unemployment insurance schemes, it was argued that they moderate the 
disciplining impact of the fear (or threat) of unemployment on the employed workers, affecting 
their effort at the workplace and thus productivity. Unemployment insurance and assistance 
benefits, via the workings of different mechanisms, allegedly also increase labour force 
participation rates, relax the incentive to work, raise wages, slow down labour mobility, and 
stimulate voluntary unemployment, among others. Some of these several expected impacts of 
unemployment insurance benefits contradict each other.5 On the one hand, it is argued that 
unemployment insurance benefits tend to dampen the incentive to remain in employment as well 
as to exit from unemployment, leading to larger long-term unemployment rates. On the other, 
that unemployment pay fosters labour force participation, the search of employment so as to 
qualify for unemployment (and other) benefits, and permits a longer employment search period 
thereby facilitating better job matching, that in turn implies less voluntary quits. Similarly, it was 
claimed that unemployment benefits stimulate both informalization (as a lax control would make 
it possible to cash unemployment benefits and to work "informally" at the same time) and 
formalization (so as to guarantee later eligibility for benefits). Again, as with employment 
protection, the evidence on the labour market impact of unemployment insurance schemes is not 
conclusive. Cross country analyses provided some support to the hypothesis of an inverse 
relationship between duration of unemployment insurance benefits and long-term unemployment 
(OECD, 1993),6 but on the whole ... "the effects of unemployment compensation on the 
functioning of labour markets are by no means clear cut" (Reissert and Schmid (1994: 
But while in relation to OECD countries there has been an increasing recognition (at least 
in the academia) of the lack of a straightforward relationship between employment protection 
On comparative dismissal rates in e.g. the U.S. and Europe see Buechtemaim (1993). 
It is nothing wrong with positing such contradictory effects theoretically as long as the mechanisms at 
work in each case are clearly specified, but while empirical evidence in North America and Europe on the net 
balance of such contrasting impacts, however vast, is not yet at all clear many academics and policy makers 
seem to take for granted that unemployment insurance has a predominantly negative labour market impact. 
6 It may be noted here that few analyses have differentiated clearly between the effects on the overall 
unemployment rate and on the rate of long-term unemployment. 
' See this study of unemployment insurances in EEC countries for more details. 
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regulations and labour market global performance, many authors concerned with Latin American 
countries still assert, on frail empirical grounds, that only if the "obstacles" and "rigidities" that 
come from employment protection were to be removed, jobs would expand and productivity 
performance improve.8 However, in a comparative study of seven Latin American countries 
(Marshall, 1994a) it was found that the laws regulating contracts and dismissals, by affecting 
both employer practices and the behaviour of wage earners, contribute to structure the labour 
market but have no discernible effect upon the performance of macroeconomic variables, mainly 
determined by other, more crucial factors. More specifically, it was concluded that more 
permissive regulations on dismissal were accompanied by higher turn-over rates and higher 
short-term employment-output elasticities (that may be regarded to be the result of employer 
practices) and by lower rates of absenteeism (that would be indicating worker behaviour), but 
not by better employment, productivity and export trends. 
This paper endeavours to supplement those findings with the analysis of the impact of 
labour law reforms in individual countries. The question to be addressed is: did the changes in 
the rules governing employment contracts and lay-offs appear to have affected each country's 
labour market operation and labour force structure? To this end, I discuss the reforms to the 
employment protection regime for the private sector implemented circa 1990 in seven South 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), that 
dealt with employment contracts, individual and collective dismissals, and income maintenance 
schemes for the unemployed, and an attempt is made to assess some of their short- and medium- 
term labour market impacts. According to the guiding hypothesis, the "flexibilization" of 
contractual-dismissal rules may be expected to affect employer and worker behaviour and the 
employment structure (e.g. employment-output elasticities, the proportion of temporary workers 
and of workers with short-term job tenure, turn-over rates), but not the levels and growth rates 
of employment and unemployment. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, I review labour law coverage and some relevant 
aspects of employment protection regimes in the selected South American countries to assess 
how these countries stand vis-à-vis the industrialized OECD countries and how significant is the 
labour force segment protected by legislation. Then, the rationale behind labour law reforms is 
discussed and the specific changes introduced are examined in detail. Finally, some of their 
labour market effects are analyzed in detail, concluding that the evidence suggests that the 
weakening of employment protection, while likely to have influenced employer practices and 
short-term employment changes, did not stimulate employment creation in the medium term; 
thus the declared purpose of the reforms was not fulfilled. 
8 Primo Braga et a!. (1995:22), for example, view the growth of unemployment in Argentina following 
trade liberalization as the outcome of ... 'onerous labor market regulations [including] anti-employment 
accidents legislation, collective bargaining set at the level of the industry ..., and high and distortive taxes on 
wages..."; and in relation to Peru, they assert that "[labor security legislation] reduced drastically the creation of 
productive employment opportunities in the formal sector... "(:22). On a similar vein, NaIm (1995:58) stated 
that "[Latin American] exporters still face such hurdles as labor codes that stifle worker productivity." 
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EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION COMPARED: SOUTH AMERICAN VIS-A-VIS OECD 
COUNTRIES 
In South America the labour code protects, in principle, all wage earners employed in 
private activity9 and, generally, also the workers of state-owned enterprises, while civil service 
employees are covered by special statutes. The size of the labour force segment protected by the 
labour code is thus quite substantial, and varies according to the importance of wage in total 
employment, a figure that of course differs across countries as does the extent of enforcement 
of legal protection. 
At the turn of the 1980s wage earners were over 60% of the labour force in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Venezuela; in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru waged workers represented more 
than 50% of the urban labour force.'° State employees protected by the special civil service 
regulations accounted for some 15-25 % of all wage earners.'1 Many waged workers are 
employed not or only partly complying with labour laws. They receive less or none of the social 
benefits stipulated by legal regulations; particularly, the obligations concerning social security 
contributions and lay-off compensation tend to be evaded more often. These "informal" waged 
workers reached about one third of wage employment in important cities of several of the 
countries analyzed in this paper.'2 Nonetheless, in theory they are protected by labour 
legislation, and to some extent labour standards represent the frame of reference for the 
contractual conditions prevailing in informal activities. But one of the most regularly used 
mechanisms to evade payment of social benefits is to avoid the very wage employment status, 
and the wage earners thus "disguised" as self employed workers - an increasing proportion - 
seldom would be able to provide proof of their entitlement. 
In any case, and even though non-compliance with labour laws generally is considerable, 
the differences in the objective possibilities for potential legal suits following unfair practices, 
deriving from cross-country variations in employment protection regimes, should be reflected 
in differential degrees of effective labour protection. 
Naturally, in the advanced OECD countries the scope of labour law coverage is much 
more extensive as it depends, first, on the importance of wage in total employment (much more 
substantial in industrialized countries) and, second, on law enforcement (indeed much laxer in 
South American countries). But within its narrower reach and with its much more limited 
enforcement, still labour law protection in South America cannot be said to be negligible. So 
With the exception, in some countries, of special groups, such as domestic service, rural workers and 
homeworkers, often covered by ad hoc statutes. 
Data are from population censuses and household surveys. 
On the basis of data on state employment in Marshall (1990). 
12 Estimates dkerge according to whether we consider either only social security coverage or obtention of 
all social benefits. In countries such as Brazil there are wide differences in coverage across regions. 
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much so that at the turn of the 1980s the elimination of many, allegedly "excessiv&', labour 
regulations became one of the cornerstones of the economic policy packages. 
The (restrictive or permissive) nature of employment protection regimes depends on 
dismissal laws, but also on the legal regulation of employment contracts not protected by lay-off 
legislation, and on the mechanisms of employment protection agreed through collective 
bargaining. Unemployment insurance and other income maintenance schemes for the unemployed 
contribute to the characterization of the protection regime. In addition, the actual degree of 
enforcement of laws and collectively agreed rules must be taken into account. 
The employment regulations (contracts and dismissals)'3 prevailing in the South 
American region until the end of the 1980s have usually been regarded as being fairly extensive 
according to international standards, and highly protective of workers' rights against dismissal: 
they provided for advance notice and/or lay-off compensation and, in certain cases, worker 
reinstatement; the just causes of lay-offs were stipulated generally quite in detail (typically: to 
leave work and repeated absence without a valid motive; intentional damage; serious offence), 
and seldom included the economic needs of the firms; and temporary contracts faced restrictions 
in several countries. Regulations are relatively intricate; this complexity was often the product 
of successive partial labour law modifications. Employment protection regimes include so-called 
capitalization funds, according to which there is a fixed cost for employers, independent from 
each individual dismissal; these funds may exist in addition to or instead of forms of employer 
compensation (severance pay) due in situations of unfair and collective lay-offs. Employment 
protection regimes may be ranked along a continuum that goes from permissive to restrictive of 
employer decisions, on the basis of the combination of regulations on employment termination 
in cases of unfair and collective dismissal, including capitalization funds, and on temporary 
contracts. Capitalization funds and unemployment insurance schemes affect also labour mobility 
through their influence on the individual worker behaviour. 
The countries examined had, prior to the 1990s reforms, either exclusively dismissal 
compensation (Argentina, Chile and Peru), or a combination of compensation and capitalization 
fund (Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and to some extent Brazil). Not all of them included in 
their labour codes advance notification of lay-offs in cases of unfair dismissal, and divergences 
in the regulation of collective lay-offs were noticeable (Chile and Venezuela had no restrictions). 
Unemployment insurance or assistance provisions existed in Brazil, Chile and Argentina,'4 but 
were very limited in scope. The reforms implied certain degree of convergence as more 
countries established capitalization funds (Peru) and created or extended unemployment insurance 
Here, as in the rest of this paper, I refer to regulations that apply to the generality of wage earners and 
not to the many specific norms for women and minors, apprenticeships, and special occupations, professions, 
areas, etc. included in most labour codes. The only specific cases considered are temporary contractual 
modalities. 
From 1984 some unemployment assistance existed in Argentina, but was so limited that it hardly qualifies 
to be called a 'scheme'. 
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(Venezuela, Argentina).15 All of these countries had some regulations defining and restricting 
the use of temporary contracts.'6 
South American labour codes have made extensive use of thresholds, in particular to 
qualify for the strongest forms of protection (such as the right to reinstatement in unfair 
dismissals). Already before the 1990s' reforms, at least four hours a day in Peru and 10 years 
of service in Colombia were necessary to obtain job security; three months of continuous 
employment with the same firm were required to be entitled to lay-off compensation in case of 
unfair dismissal in Argentina and Peru, one year in Chile and Brazil, and eight months in 
Venezuela; firm size (defined in terms of number of employees and/or production value) affected 
entitlement to some benefits in Colombia and Venezuela. Apart from the foregoing, the diverse 
forms of temporary contracts implied specific exclusions from entitlement, the most important 
of which is lay-off compensation (some contracts require reduced compensation at termination, 
e.g. in Argentina). Exclusions may affect a comparatively marginal segment of the wage earning 
labour force or a more substantial portion (for instance, temporary employment was a mere 1 % 
of wage emp'oyment in Sao Paulo, in the range of 10-15% in Buenos Aires and the main 
Colombian cities, but over 30% in Lima).'7 
In most of the EEC countries the law provides for advance notice and compensation in 
case of unfair dismissal (length and amount vary across countries), and in many of them 
temporary contracts are regulated (only two of the 12 EEC countries have no restrictions 
whatsoever, and other three little limitations).18 But in the advanced European countries it was 
not dismissal compensation costs but advance notice requirements and the legal procedures 
involved in lay-offs what employers ranked as the most serious interferences (Emerson, 1988) 
with their freedom to separate "at will" the unwanted workers. Dismissals, particularly collective 
lay-offs, often require some intervention of work councils or trade unions, and sometimes also 
prior government authorization.19 In addition, collective agreements may include clauses on 
The Chilean government proposed in 1993 a new unemployment insurance system that would share with 
capitalization funds the fact that contributions would be deposited in a worker's personal savings account (see 
Cortázar, 1995); in 1995 it had not yet been implemented. 
6 Regulations on dismissal, temporary contracts and unemployment insurance in the selected South 
American countries are summarily described in tables 1, 2 and 3. 
17 Data are for the late 1980s. See Marshall (1994a) on the role of labour laws in explaining these 
disparities. 
Details are in European Commission (1994); OECD (1993); Mosley (1994). 
In Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom employers must consult with employee 
representatives before unfair dismissal; in the Netherlands individual dismissal requires prior government 
authorization; in all EEC countries collective lay-offs require prior consultation with worker representatives and 
advance notice to the government, and prior government authorization in the Netherlands, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal (Mosley, 1994). In Germany, for instance, the works council must be consulted before dismissals, 
although management retains the final say; the works council has some say in the event of massive lay-offs 
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massive dismissals and/or on temporary contracts. 
By contrast, in South American countries, government authorization was required only 
in the case of collective dismissals and, even then, only in a few countries (e.g. in two - 
Colombia and Peru - out of the seven examined here).2° Legally stipulated union intervention 
in approving, delaying or impeding lay-offs is practically non existent in South America,21 
where the state plays a paternalistic role and labour organizations often are less autonomous and 
have little strength (this does not mean, of course, that unions in South America will not take 
action in the event of dismissals, particularly collective redundancies, to avoid, delay or 
minimize lay-offs). Further, while in the South American countries employment standards 
legislation in respect to dismissals in practice tends to set, with a few exceptions confined to 
specific economic activities, not only the minimum but also the maximum standard, in Europe 
it tends to establish the floor of rights, that is exceeded by arrangements agreed through 
collective bargaining, that generally increase worker protection. Last, law enforcement in the 
South American region is distinctly laxer than in OECD countries, and this works as a factual 
extension of the "loopholes" where dismissal protection does not apply. 
While comparison with EEC countries, where legal employment protection tends to be 
stringent, sheds some light on the limitations of South American employment standards 
legislation, comparison with the U.S. and Canada, where employment protection is laxer, may 
highlight different aspects, one of which is the impact of law enforcement. In several Canadian 
provinces,22 for instance, the notice period may exceed the usual one-month warning in the 
South American countries analyzed in this research,23 but severance pay is strikingly lower in 
(management should inform, consult and negotiate a social plan to compensate the dismissed workers); see 
Abraham and Houseman (1993). Buechtemanii (1993) cites evidence on the weak effective role of either works 
councils (Germany) or government intervention (France) in impeding dismissals, but also notes the 
psychological impact of regulations. In any case, the situation in Europe in this respect clearly differs from what 
prevails in South America. 
20 Bronstein (1990) noted that in Latin America protection against collective dismissal is underdeveloped. 
According to Dombois and Pries (1994:66), in the 1980s [Colombiani "employers sought to circumvent the need 
for government approval for mass redundancies by concluding apparently voluntary redundancy agreements" to 
avoid potential rejection or delays; after the 1990 law reform,..." applications for mass redundancies are being 
made directly to the ministry, where they are being decided rapidly and in the employers' favour (examples: 
Sofasa-Renault and Avianca). 
2! One exception, at least in paper, is that of Brazil (see table 1). 
22 Most of the employment protection legislation in Canada comes from the provincial governments (Baker 
et al., 1995); federal and provincial legislation do not supersede each other but apply to different activities. In 
certain aspects, some provincial laws are somewhat more restrictive than federal legislation, but anyway both 
place Canada at a relatively low position within the OECD context (data in OECD, 1993:97). See also summary 
information in table A, Appendix. 
23 Advance notice requirements vary across jurisdictions, averaging about a one-week notice per year of 
employment, with an eight-week notice maximum (Baker et a!., 1995). 
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Canada (two-day wages per year of service and only after one year continuous employment with 
the firm according to federal regulations, and one day wage after five years of employment in 
the Ontario province) than the customary one month per year (with top limits) in South America. 
Longer advance notification than in South American countries apply however in Canada to 
collective lay-offs,24 and often efforts to minimize massive job losses in consultation with 
worker representatives are expected, but it is difficult to say whether, on balance, legislation in 
this particular aspect is tighter or laxer than in South America. 
While somewhat more restrictive than in the U.S., Canadian legal regulations on unfair 
dismissal are much weaker than in Europe. Most major collective agreements include seniority 
provisions that regulate lay-offs, however.25 And, indeed, the proportion of workers with short- 
term tenure is higher in Canada, and that of workers with long tenure (10 years or over) smaller, 
than in most European countries, but comparable to the U.S.26 Turn-over rates also are higher 
in Canada than in Europe, but again similar to the U.S.27 But the job tenure distribution of 
Canadian workers shows considerable similarity with those of workers in South American 
countries that supposedly have a much more restrictive legislation on dismissal; further, among 
Canadians the share of long-term tenured workers is larger than in certain South American 
countries (table B, appendix).28 Apart from the fact that the protection of collective lay-offs 
could be considered to be tighter in Canada, factors other than the global permissive/restrictive 
Collective lay-offs demand a notice period (eight to 16 weeks), that varies according to the number of 
workers to be dismissed (starting with 50 employees, sometimes 10; Baker et a!., 1995), within a determined 
period, generally four weeks; there is some variation across jurisdictions (Labour Canada, 1993-94). 
25 Meltz (1989) found that job security provisions in collective agreements normally do not provide 
employment guarantees but do regulate the lay-off mechanism (seniority, notice, recall procedures, severance 
pay, etc.), and less often also the contracting out of work. Carter (1989) argues that most collective agreements 
restrict the managerial prerogative with "just cause" provisions in cases of "discharge", that might lead to 
individual worker reinstatement, and seniority lay-off regulations, while many have clauses impeding the 
contracting out of work. 
26 The share of workers with less than one year employment was 28.8% in the U.S. and 23.5% in Canada, 
but 15.7 % in France and 12.8% in Germany (however in Spain and the Netherlands the figures are close to 
those for Canada, as temporary contracts were unusually widespread, particularly in Spain; OECD, 1993). Note 
that this OECD study did not find a strong relationship between job security legislation and job tenure 
distributions. 
27 Separation rates in 1986, for instance, were 2.0 and 2.2 in Canada and the U.S., respectively, but 1.0 in 
France and 1.5 in the U.K. ((Lemaitre et al., 1992). 
28 Note that turn-over rates in Canada are similar to Brazilian rates but exceed Argentinean's (table C, 
Appendix), somewhat in contradiction with the comparative structures of job tenure (in the South American 
countries, turn-over rates come from enterprise surveys, and job tenure distributions from household surveys, 
the latter covering a much wider spectrum of workers). 
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nature of dismissal legislation clearly are at work here.29 On the one hand, the differential 
degree of law enforcement and compliance - low in South America and high in Canada.3° On 
the other, in Canada the seniority rules that regulate lay-offs, established in collective 
agreements, are widespread, while very probably in the South American countries such rules are 
confined to a few economic activities; this could contribute to explain the higher proportion of 
workers with over 10 years tenure in Canada. Besides, differences in the size distribution of 
firms and in employer internal labour market policies, as well as in the incentives to voluntary 
employment terminations surely need to be taken into account. Finally, the use of temporary 
workers is extensive in certain South American countries where regulations on dismissal are taut 
or lay-off costs are high. 
There is no specific legislation regulating temporary work in Canada (OECD, 1993) and, 
given the absence of serious constraints on lay-offs, there is little incentive, in any case, to foster 
use of temporary contracts. Use of temporary work in Canada in the late 1980s, a figure 
comparable to that of countries with more restrictive dismissal legislation, seems to be 
concentrated in sectors that normally have "intrinsic" requirements for temporary work, such 
as construction.3' At that time, the share of temporary in total employment in certain South 
American countries (e.g. Argentina), where temporary work is legally regulated, was not far 
from the figure for Canada, where it is not restricted;32 in others (in Colombia and, 
particularly, Peru), it was, however, more widespread, in agreement with their more severe lay- 
off regulations (Marshall, 1994a). 
Unemployment insurance schemes33 are extremely much more developed in Europe and 
North America than in South America. In fact, what sets the most important difference between 
OECD and South American countries is the unemployment insurance system and the existence 
in the former of active labour market programmes.34 Unemployment insurance schemes, if they 
29 One lesson to be drawn from this comparison seems to be that it is more fruitful to compare intra Latin 
America, intra EEC or intra North America, than inter regions characterized by extremely different labour 
markets and labour protection regimes. 
On the latter, Baker et a!. (1995). 
See OECD (1993). In 1989 about 8-10% of all workers were employed in temporary jobs (defined as 
contracts of less than six months' duration), a proportion close to those in Germany (11%) and France (8.5%) 
in the same year. 
32 Note that the definitions of 'temporary' employments differ. 
Under unemployment insurance I include hereon the so-called unemployment assistance schemes. 
See Gunderson and Riddell (1995; OECD data for 1990) for GNP share of unemployment insurance 
expenditure in North America and Europe, and Boyer (1993) on active labour market policy expenditure. In 
Latin America the GNP share of unemployment insurance expenditure seems to be negligible (see Freije 
Rodriguez et al., 1994 on Venezuela); it would be interesting to have data (n.a.) on the GNP share of 
capitalization funds. 
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exist at all in South America, have a very limited coverage (table 3),35 and active labour market 
policies in general are entirely absent. While the formal wage replacement rate and duration of 
benefits of the unemployment insurance systems in South America at first glance might look to 
be not that far from those of the schemes of OECD countries, the actual benefits are generally 
far below that of advanced countries.36 Further, the degree of effective coverage is significantly 
distinct. One reason behind this is that in the EEC countries generally involuntary employment 
termination is not a requisite for entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits (although a 
waiting period applies in certain countries if unemployment was voluntary), while in South 
America, except for Venezuela, only workers in involuntary unemployment (dismissed without 
just cause, made redundant collectively, etc.) are entitled. 
Comparison of the South American situation with Canada is illuminating as the latter's 
scheme of unemployment insurance is considered to provide substantial coverage in the 
international context.37 In 1990 the actual wage replacement rate in Canada exceeded those of 
eight out of 13 OECD countries, although in terms of unemployment benefit duration Canada 
ranked much lower (exceeding only four of 16 countries).38 
The high degree of effective coverage of the Canadian unemployment insurance39 
contrasts sharply with South American unemployment insurance schemes (see table 3) as does 
the actual proportion of unemployed workers receiving unemployment benefits. Eligibility 
criteria including qualifying period are less stringent in Canada and, of course, the proportion 
of wage earners (i.e. the universe of those eligible) is much But the factors that may 
explain the insignificant degree of unemployment insurance coverage in South America also 
include the different composition of the unemployed population - in South America many had 
been employed without registration ("illegally") and not insured with the social security system, 
In this table Uruguay is also included, although no major reforms were introduced lately, as it has a 
relatively old unemployment insurance system. 
36 Wage replacement rates and benefit duration vary considerably across the EEC countries, and in 7 out of 
twelve EEC countries benefits are in fact unlimited in the second stage (when benefits represent a lower 
proportion of wages); often benefits considerably exceed those of South American unemployment insurances 
(see Reissert and Schmid, 1994; European Commission, 1994). 
See OECD (1993) and Gunderson and Riddell (1995). 
38 OECD (1993). Wage replacement rates in Canada went down from 67% in 1972 to 55% in 1994, and 
there is a ceiling; the duration of benefits varies with regional unemployment rates and the number of weeks 
worked in the previous year. to a maximum of 50 weeks (see Gunderson and Riddell, 1995, for further detail). 
In 1988 the average duration of unemployment benefits was 18.1 weeks (estimate in Card and Riddell, 1993). 
See Card and Riddell (1993); Gunderson and Riddell (1995). 
4° All workers except those aged 65 and over, the self employed, those working less than 15 hours a week 
and those earning less than 20% of maximum weekly insurable earnings are eligible; the qualifying period is 12- 
20 weeks depending on regional unemployment rates (more details in Gunderson and Riddell, 1995). 
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or had been employed in sectors not covered by the schemes, such as domestic service and often 
construction. Besides, information, particularly on new schemes, is little widespread. 
Mandatory compensation for unfair dismissal in South American countries (including the 
recently spreading capitalization funds), linked to length of service (normally a full monthly 
wage per year of employment), might make protection somewhat more equivalent to that of 
unemployment insurance, but only in the case of workers with long job tenure and provided no 
time limit was imposed on compensation (for example, in Chile there is a 10-month maximum 
compensation, to be obtained by workers with ten years of service or more). Short-tenure 
employees clearly are at a disadvantage in South America vis-à-vis Canada,4' and since the cost 
of dismissing these workers is low, protective legislation is no serious deterrent. Paradoxically, 
in Canada the relative cost to employers (i.e. the unemployment insurance payroll tax) seems 
to be lower than employer contributions to the capitalization funds in South America.42 
LABOUR LAW REFORMS 
The reforms to labour laws undertaken at the end of the 1980s-beginning of the 1990s 
in the South American region followed contrasting paths in, on the one hand Argentina and 
Peru, and on the other Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. Reforms in the first group of countries were 
oriented to relax labour protection while in the second protection was improved vis-ã-vis what 
in Brazil and Chile earlier had been clearly less protection than the average for the region. 
Reforms in Colombia and Ecuador, while globally directed also at curtailing protection, were 
somewhat hybrid, in the sense that in certain areas it was loosened but in a few others 
strengthened. The reforms were either introduced once and for all or resulted from piece-meal 
accumulative changes that, in Peru for instance, implied an extensive body of new regulations 
enacted through numerous Executive decrees. 
The minimum of two and a half months of unemployment benefits in Canada is equivalent to mandatory 
lay-off compensation corresponding to two and a half years of tenure in South America. 
42 In Canada contributions have been modified often by the government. Until 1990 unemployment 
insurance had tripartite financing. After the 1994 reform, contributions were 4.3% and 3%, employers and 
workers respectively (Gunderson and Riddell, 1995). In Brazil, the employer contribution to the termination 
fund is 8% of the wage bill, 9.7% in Peni and 9.9% in Venezuela. Some of these countries have also 
unemployment insurances, but employer contributions are low (1.5% of the payroll in Argentina, and 1.7%, 
with a ceiling, in Venezuela, for instance). 
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Rationale behind labour law reforms 
Labour law43 is one of the most crucial of state instruments to regulate the supply, price 
and conditions of use of labour as well as social and as such its contents tend to be 
reformed to adapt labour market operation to changes in the prevailing economic model. Labour 
legislation constitutes one of the clearest expression of the dominant ideology and state's labour 
policy, but expresses also the outcome of the political struggle inherent to the legislative process. 
The legal regime tends to be more stable than other labour policies, showing stronger resistance 
to change. This notwithstanding, at certain times of harsh economic transformation, and 
subjected to strong pressure, the legal system might be adjusted quite fast to the new economic 
and social environment, and this often implies the legalization of preexisting but de facto 
practices. This might have been the case in certain South American cases at the turn of the 
1980s, although the many hesitations and numerous regulations in opposite directions might be 
expressing the social and political resistance to reform the well established legal systems. 
The governments of Argentina, Colombia. Ecuador and Peru, and in fact also Venezuela, 
at slightly different times, to diverse degrees and indeed with varying success, were actively 
devising and applying economic programmes that followed the basic prescriptions of what was 
to be known as the "Washington Consensus": redefinition of state activity (deregulation, 
privatization), and trade, financial and foreign investment liberalization. By the turn of the 1980s 
and early 1990s the neoliberal move in Latin America's prevailing economic strategies was 
sweeping. In Chile, certainly the pioneer in the turn toward neoliberal economic programmes 
within the Latin America context, those objectives had been accomplished much earlier.45 With 
the Plan de Convertibilidad of 1991, president Menem's government liberalized trade in 
Argentina, deregulated the financial system and the inflow of foreign capital, established the free 
convertibility of domestic currency, while in fact fixing a low exchange rate to be backed by 
international reserves, partially privatized the social security system, and sold most of state 
enterprises (Marshall, 1994b). In Colombia, starting in 1990 during president Gaviria's term, 
drastic reforms were introduced with a view at opening up the economy (elimination of the 
Substantive labour law stipulates the minimum and niaximum labour standards, and legislation on 
procedure who are entitled to set and enforce them. While the former limits the entrepreneurial prerogative and 
the freedom of contract, regulation on procedure shifts negotiation from the individual worker to collective 
agents, namely trade unions (Muckenberger, 1989). 
The other instruments of state social intervention that regulate labour and conflict are social transferences 
and free provision of goods and services, social security, population and family law, and labour market policies 
(Cones and Marshall, 1993). Unemployment insurance schemes may be regarded as part of the social security 
system, state social transferences, labour market policies, or a combination thereof. In any case, hereon, when I 
speak of labour laws, I am including unemployment insurance, no matter whether it is financed Out of employer 
and worker contributions and/or general state revenues, and whether they provide money transfers. 
See e.g. Paus (1994); economic restructuring in Chile started about 1974 under the military government, 
with price, financial and import liberalization; social security reform followed, while privatization was to be a 
more gradual process. 
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system of import licenses and reduction of protectionism in 1990-91), eliminating foreign 
exchange controls (1990), restructuring the public sector, and changing the social security system 
(1993).46 An earlier (1984-88) neoliberal stabilization plan in Ecuador was followed by the 
more interventionist stance of Borja's administration, during whose term (1988-92), however, 
labour laws were reformed.47 More resolute market-oriented policies were reintroduced as from 
1992, with president's Durán's new stabilization plan. Labour law reform in Ecuador thus 
predates the application of the liberalization programme. But at the time of the labour law 
reform the government had been keen in attracting foreign investment and in 1991 applied some 
measures to this end (Hofman and Buitelaar, 1994); the creation of maquila industries (with 
fewer restrictions on profit remittances and waiving of trade licenses),48 where the labour code 
did not apply, as well as the changes in labour laws should be viewed in the context of this more 
liberal attitude to foreign investment. President Fujimori's policies in Peru adopted quite similar 
contents since and in Venezuela, it was Perez who, since 1989, attempted to put in 
practice the same ideas but faced several obstacles that hindered full implementation even before 
the political collapse of In Brazil, however, the steps towards conversion to a more 
market-oriented economic programme were more hesitant; the process seems to have been 
gaining momentum only as late as 1995. 
In the countries that at the turn of the 1980s pursued the "flexibilization" approach in 
relation to labour laws while adopting neoliberal economic policies and undertaking "state 
reforms", the passing of the new legislation was preceded and accompanied by debates, often 
heated, that reproduced the "flexibility" controversies in Western Europe during the 1980s. In 
Argentina, for instance, the "flexibilization" of employment standards started to be discussed in 
the late 1980s, and by 1995 the debate had not yet ended. The Executive promoted successive 
projects - each one in turn considered to have failed and insufficient to achieve the sought for 
labour "flexibility"; trade union leaders accepted each successive reform in exchange for other 
issues at stake, such as preservation of the traditional trade union control of the funds of the 
employer-and-worker-financed health care scheme. In this group of countries governments and 
business claimed that the loosening of labour protection was indispensable to foster 
competitiveness in an increasingly internationally integrated economy. The allegedly high labour 
protection was considered to have been "affordable" only in economies sheltered from 
international competition, and no longer appropriate to the new orientation of the economic 
strategies, that had switched from import-substitution industrialization for the domestic market 
toward export-led growth. It was sustained that certain labour rights slackened the work effort, 
More details are in Reyes (1994). 
See de Janvry et a!. (1994) for a detailed analysis of the evolution of economic policies in Ecuador and, 
in particular, the somewhat contradictory steps taken during the 1988-1992 period. 
48 de Janvry et al. (1994). 
Seniinario and Galarza (1993). 
5° Further details are in Naim (1993). 
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discouraged labour productivity growth, fostered illegal employment practices, and deterred 
business from creating employment. The reduction of labour costs and greater freedom to 
manage the work force resulting from curtailed employment protection were expected to promote 
employment generation - at least this was the declared aim and justification of several legal 
pieces introducing or facilitating flexible contracts, and in Peru the bill indeed was named 
"employment promotion act". 
Why did labour legislation reform in Brazil (1988), Chile (1990) and Venezuela (1990) 
go in the opposite direction? No doubt Chile, followed by Brazil, before the reforms had much 
less restrictive labour protection regimes than other South America countries, and the change 
towards improving protection was associated with these countries's democratization process. The 
former erosion of labour rights had been one central component of not only the military's 
repressive labour policies but also of their economic strategies,5' that in the case of Chile had 
implied the total transformation of individual and collective labour legislation. After lengthy 
debates - and employer opposition the civilian government in Chile undertook as from 1990 
modest legislative reforms in crucial areas, in the context of decreasing unemployment levels and 
improving economic performance. In Brazil too, collective labour regulation had experienced 
major setbacks, and constraints on dismissals had been relaxed in 1966; the 1988 Constitutional 
reform was intended to reverse, at least partially, that situation. In Venezuela the new labour 
law project had been drafted earlier (1985), and was to be approved by Congress after prolonged 
discussion, five years later, during Perez' mandate; Perez opposed a project that was considered 
to be inconsistent with the ongoing economic liberalization process and tried to get Congress to 
postpone its treatment, but did not exercise his right to veto a law that was supported by most 
political parties and the unions.52 
The reforms53 
I consider here three main areas of change in labour laws: contracts, individual and 
collective dismissal, and unemployment insurance schemes. In tables 1 to 3 pre and post reform 
features in each of those areas are shown for each country.54 
Contracts 
The scope of application of labour law seldom is universal, even if we consider wage 
See Paus (1994) on Chile. 
52 On the developments preceding the new labour law see Elmer (1993). 
The examples of legislative reforms mentioned below do not exhaust the changes introduced. 
In these tables I describe only the major reforms affecting the generality of wage earners, that is, not 
those applying to specific groups, cases and circumstances. 
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earners exclusively. In general, by defining those who are entitled to social benefits, laws 
simultaneously define those who are to be excluded from access to legal protection.55 This is 
achieved by fixing entitlement thresholds (in terms of hours of work, firm size, working days, 
age, whatever), that originate a legally-based form of labour fragmentation that adds to the well 
known social mechanisms that generate segmentation in the labour market. Protective legislation 
and trade-union negotiated regulations mean additional labour costs (in the present case, 
mandatory severance pay and advance warning, contributions to social security) and, besides, 
many employers consider that they undermine labour discipline and the work effort. Both factors 
give rise to practices devised to avoid or mask either the constitution of the wage employment 
status (e.g. contracting out to self employed workers) or at least the paradigmatic relationship 
(resorting to situations or contracts characterized by some exclusion from entitlement to benefits 
entailed by the standard employment relationship). These practices may be built upon exclusions 
already imbedded in the legal system of labour regulation ("atypical" or "non standard" 
contracts) or enter into the spurious or fraudulent use of legal exceptions, including 
fragmentation of the working day to profit from a less than four-hour threshold; fictitious 
divisions of firms to qualify for "small" firm benefits; misuse of temporary contractual 
modalities; etc. (Marshall, 1992). The least are the legal "loopholes" available to firms, or the 
more restrictive is legislation on their utilization to evade the standard employment relationship, 
the most extensive would be the use of downright illegal practices including the wholly 
clandestine employment forms. 
Some reforms to labour legislation were intended to expand the legal "loopholes". The 
most conspicuous mechanisms for extending exclusions from entitlement normally are 1) to 
change the length of the "trial period", during which workers have no rights to protection against 
dismissal and sometimes neither to other benefits (not implemented in the reforms discussed 
here; instead, in Venezuela the minimum period for being entitled to dismissal compensation was 
shortened); ii) to create new modalities of temporary, casual and other specific contracts, or to 
eliminate or reduce restrictions on the utilization of preexisting ones; and iii) to establish "free 
zones" and "maquilas", not covered by labour codes, to be governed by distinct and taxer rules. 
The daring attempt in 1995 in Argentina at exempting so called "small firms" from certain of 
the general labour code regulations,56 that followed the Employment Law of 1991 where a 
number of "promoted" temporary contracts had been established; the variety of new temporary 
contracts created in Peru as from 1991; the loosening of limitations on temporary contracts - that 
already were extremely easy - enacted in 1990 in Colombia (elimination of the one-year 
This is the "selective function" of the standard employment contract, according to Muckenberger (1989). 
The "New Labour Regime for Small and Medium Enterprises" defined the 'small firm' in terms of both 
number of employees and output volume. I do not discuss here the 1995 reforms in Argentina as it is too early 
to examine their labour market impacts. 
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minimum);57 the creation of "maquilas" and free zones in Ecuador and Peru,58 and of part- 
time contracts in Ecuador for week-end work with ordinary instead of overtime wage;59 all 
these were intended to facilitate more flexible employment contracts with less entitlement to 
social benefits.6° 
But in the same years other countries tightened the restrictions on temporary contracts, 
consistently with their global move toward the strengthening of labour protection. In Chile the 
maximum period for fixed term contracts was reduced from two years to one, and in Venezuela 
from five to three years in the case of white collar employees (but skilled manual workers 
became worse off with the new rules); further, in Venezuela the type of tasks for which these 
contracts were to be allowed was defined more restrictively. 
Dismissals 
Apart from establishing exclusions to the general protection against dismissal, dismissal 
rules may be modified directly by addressing, among others, the causes for fair dismissal, the 
very existence and amount of, and the entitlement requirements to, lay-off compensation, and 
the rules on job security in the strict sense (right to reinstatement). In Peru the causes for fair 
dismissal were extended to include "absence of punctuality" and deficient worker performance 
under certain conditions, and the right to reinstatement was weakened. A reduced employer 
compensation was to be supplemented by the newly created capitalization fund. In Argentina, 
lay-off compensation had been increased in 1989, as the basis for calculating the ceiling to length 
of service compensation was raised from three minimum wages to three total earnings exclusive 
of seniority benefits. This change preceded the economic reforms and was against the "spirit" 
of the other labour law reforms. In Ecuador the "stability clause" - a minimum of one year of 
employment before "eviction" is to be allowed - was (somewhat) relaxed and advance notice 
eliminated, but compensation for unfair dismissal was made more favourable to workers, and 
In Ecuador the orientation of the changes in the regulation of temporary work seems to have been less 
clear: while the one-year minimum requirement was somewhat relaxed, at the same time the nature of the 
contracts was defined more precisely and the requisite of "objective causes" for casual/occasional contracts was 
introduced. Pita (1993) argues however that with the Labour Code reforni a broader range of contracts became 
available to employers. 
58 The labour regime to be applied in free zones and maquilas established that all employment contracts 
(which are renewable indefinitely) are temporary, remunerations and working conditions freely agreed (with 
some Ilinitations in Ecuador), and there is no job security. 
See Pita (1993). 
60 At the same time, in some countries the activity of temporary labour agencies and intermediaries was 
regulated further, generally to prevent abuses and fraud. In Colombia, for instance, the 1990 law defined the 
rights of workers employed through labour agencies and stipulated the conditions in which such agencies were 
to be permitted to provide labour. Also in Argentina their activities became more extensively regulated as from 
1991, worker rights were made explicit, and the joint responsibility of the user firm in relation to all social 
benefits (eliminated in 1976) was reinstated. 
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employees who lost their jobs due to collective lay-offs became entitled to compensation.6' In 
Colombia, employment stability, until 1990 available to workers with 10 or more years of 
continuous employment with the same firm, was eliminated (and compensation for these workers 
was slightly raised), the global cost of dismissal was lowered,62 and "firm modernization" was 
included explicitly among the accepted causes for massive lay-offs; however, collective dismissal 
(now more precisely defined) was made more onerous and the previous reduced compensation 
for small firms was eliminated in the case of unfair (but not of collective) lay-offs. In Venezuela 
employer compensation was eliminated; compensation was to come out exclusively from the 
capitalization fund, the benefits of which are granted to all workers, whatever the cause of 
employment termination. 
But Venezuela is best characterized by its reinforcement of worker protection against 
dismissal, as "absolute" job security was introduced in 1990 (the right to reinstatement), 
susceptible to be replaced by the double of the normal lay-off compensation,63 and lay-offs due 
to force majeure acquired the same status as unfair The cost of lay-off was 
increased in Chile, but this had an impact only for workers that had been employed over five 
years, as the change approximately doubled the time ceiling to lay-off compensation; the earlier 
clauses that had been intended to rule out the collective action of workers were eliminated from 
the fair causes of dismissal; on the other hand, in the event of dismissal due to "modernization 
and economic needs of the firm" workers are now entitled to compensation as in unfair lay-offs. 
In Brazil the lay-off "penalty" on employers was increased in 1988 from a mere 10% to 40% 
of the accumulated individual worker employment termination fund; the penalty for collective 
dismissals was also raised. 
Unemployment insurance schemes 
As we have seen, very few South American countries had unemployment insurance 
schemes prior to the 1990s, and where they existed they were embryonic; benefits were very 
small and coverage confined to very few unemployed workers. In some of these countries, the 
system was improved substantially (Argentina), although coverage continues to be very limited. 
Others established schemes for the first time (Venezuela). Even though there has been 
considerable discussion on the benefits of incorporating unemployment insurance schemes to the 
labour protection regimes, so as to separate individual and collective lay-offs from direct 
compensation costs for firms and to facilitate labour mobility while providing income 
According to Pita (1993) the reforms tended to undermine employment security. 
62 This was due to the reform of the capitalization fund (to which workers are entitled irrespective of the 
cause of employment termination) that eliminated the clause adjusting the accumulated fund each time wages 
were raised and changed the rules that governed partial withdrawals from the fund. According to LOpez (1993), 
the pre reform regulations had stimulated short-term employment. 
See more details on how compensation is estimated in Freije Rodriguez et al. (1994). 
An effort was niade also at characterizing more precisely the fair causes of dismissal. 
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maintenance to the dismissed workers,65 on the whole, in the countries studied, the systems 
continue to be rudimentary. 
Given the very marginal role still played by unemployment insurances in the South 
American countries examined, it seems premature to attempt the study of their labour market 
impact.66 The cases of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela are the only ones where comparison 
over time would be possible but, as mentioned earlier, coverage is too small to allow a really 
meaningful analysis. 
LABOUR MARKET INIPACTS OF LABOUR LAW REFORMS67 
Increased protection against unfair and/or collective dismissal may be expected to be 
followed by the decline of employment sensitivity to short-run changes in the level of output (i.e. 
by the fall of the employment-output elasticity),68 and by less turn-over than before the labour 
See e.g. the 1993 proposal for Chile still under debate in 1995, that combines mandatory severance pay, 
mandatory individual savings and employer contributions (a kind of capitalization fund), loans and a component 
of income transfer to the poorest unemployed (Cortizar, 1995). 
66 Amadeo and Gonzaga (1994) argue that in Brazil the unemployment insurance scheme stimulated 
informalization as workers were able to simultaneously work and cash unemployment insurance benefits during 
four months, while employers avoided registering these workers and thus paying the corresponding social 
security contributions; this allegedly was possible because of the lack of government control on the activity of 
the unemployed receiving unemployment benefits; no estimates are presented on how important might this 
segment of the unemployed be. They suggest that the introduction of the unemployment insurance in 1986 
contributed to downplay the adjustment role of unemployment in recessions. 
67 Only fragmented data were available, and with these we try to provide a tentative evaluation of the 
impacts of the labour law reforms described above. In particular, at the time of writing, employment data for 
Ecuador were not readily available, so that in this section I discuss trends in the other six countries only. 
68 Available data for the South American countries analyzed are for manufacturing. That is why only 
employment-output elasticities in manufacturing are examined in what follows. More sophisticated analyses of 
the relationship between employment protection and employment-output elasticities are e.g. in Abraham and 
Housenian (l993a and b), who found that in the short run German employers adjusted employment levels to 
changes in demand proportionately less than their U.S. counterparts, but compensated this by adjusting hours 
(1993a) and that Japanese firms (not considering the small business sector that generally bears the burden of 
adjustment) adjusted employment more slowly than U.S. firms (1993h). Given the limitations of available data, 
such sophisticated techniques that differentiate between short (monthly) and longer term adjustment and coiisider 
time lags cannot be used in the analysis of South American countries; therefore, I compare average 
employment-output elasticities (i.e. the average of annual employment-output elasticities), before and after the 
legislative reforms, separating the recession and expansion periods. 
While cross-country comparison of manufacturing employment-output elasticities in Latin America 
suggested that they tended to reflect inter-country differences in employment protection regimes (Marshall, 
1994a), studies on Chile over time came with mixed evidence (see Allen and Labadie, 1994, and references 
therein). 
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law reforms, much more so if at the same time regulations on temporary contracts became more 
restrictive. Lower turn-over rates should also be reflected by changes in the structure of job 
tenure. By contrast, in the countries where dismissal was made easier and temporary 
employment specially encouraged, this may be expected to show in higher employment-output 
elasticities and turn-over rates than what had been the usual before the labour law 
reforms 69 
What were the main trends in the three countries that tightened employment protection? 
In Brazil, the conclusions regarding the evolution of employment-output elasticities differ 
depending of what years of the pre and post reform periods are contrasted (table 4); however, 
if the two major pre and post reform recessions are compared (1982-83 and 1990-92), the 
employment-output elasticity - still rather high - clearly fell; this might be the consequence of 
a lower firing rate as a result of the increased penalty on dismissal. In addition, after the labour 
law reform there was some change in the structure of job tenure, in both the private sector at 
large and manufacturing in particular (a fall of the proportion of workers with shorter term 
tenure and an increase in the proportion with more seniority).70 Two factors could contribute 
to explain this development: the decrease of turn-over rates (that declined gradually after 1988, 
with a slight recovery in but also simply the lack of new hiring.72 In 1990-92 a deep 
recession accompanied by productive reorganization led to the persistent fall of employment (a 
fall that continued through 1993) and the growth of unemployment.73 The customary high turn- 
over in Brazil had been the outcome of both unconstrained dismissals and willingness of workers 
to voluntarily quit their jobs so as to have access to the accumulated income in their 
capitalization funds.74 In turn, the fall in turn-over rates after 1988 (while the situation with 
respect to entitlement to the fund did not change), points as much to a change in business 
practices in response to the increased penalty imposed on employers in the event of unfair and 
collective dismissals as to a reduction in voluntary quits due to the growth of unemployment. 
Ideally, the impact of changes in dismissal rules on the rate of effective lay-offs should be examined, but 
data are not readily available. This was studied (by looking at the labour force percent that is unemployed 
because of having lost the job) by Allen and Labadie (1994) for Chile, finding that a greater freedom to disniiss 
resulted in higher firing rates. 
Workers with up to 3 months employment were 14.3% in 1988 and 9.9% in 1992; those with over 10 
years seniority, 11.9% and 15.4%, respectively (manufacturing): data are for Sao Paulo (SEADE-Diesse, 1988- 
92). 
7! Average monthly turn-over was 3.80 in 1988, 2.73 in 1993 (Arnadeo and Gonzaga. 1994). 
72 The fact that the most substantial change in the structure of job tenure took place by 1992 rather than 
immediately following the reforms, points to the influence of absence of new hiring. 
Employment data are in CEPAL (1994a) and also, for Sao Paulo, in Andraus (1993); the unemployment 
rate in 1992 (5.8%) was almost double that of 1989 (data in CEPAL, 1994b; six metropolitan areas). 
The long standing role of the Brazilian capitalization fund in stimulating voluntary quits was noted by 
several writers (see references cited in Marshall, 1994a). 
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On the other hand, in this same period, the employment fall was concentrated in the group of 
employees with "cartera assinada" (the registered workers with access to all the legal benefits; 
-10.6% in 1989-92), while the employment of non registered waged workers, with no benefits, 
and of subcontracted workers increased (2.6% and 10.8%, respectively; Andraus, 1993). This 
employment restructuring to the detriment of regular and permanent employees and in favour 
of workers with a looser or more vague employment relationship might have been one sequel 
to the tightening of job protection. No special temporary contracts have been made available in 
Brazil - as they had in Argentina or Peru - and this might have contributed to expand "illegal" 
and "non wage" employment. In brief, the strengthening of employment protection in Brazil 
might have had some influence on labour market behaviour via changes in business practices: 
both less dismissals and expansion of subcontracting and non registered employment during the 
recessive period. 
Also in Chile employment-output elasticities in manufacturing fell after the legislative 
reform (table 4), during a period (199 1-93) of rapid economic expansion. But it is not possible 
to attribute such fall unambiguously to a slowing down in recruitment associated with the rise 
in the costs of potential lay-offs - as the neoliberal argument runs - and to the somewhat less 
permissive regulations on temporary contracts. First, the 1993 employment-output elasticity was 
only slightly below that of the pre reform (1983-90) expansion phase. And second, in 1990-92 
productivity in manufacturing increased at a rate (4% per year) well above the 1980s' average 
(0.8% annually, Marshall, 1994a), to decline in 1993 (-4.8%). Thus, at first glance the evidence 
for Chile is consistent with what might be expected from the improvement in employment 
protection, but while the legislative changes might have played a role in explaining the drop in 
employment-output elasticities in the latter might, just as well, been at least partially 
the result of a short-term "jump" in labour productivity growth, based on some labour-saving 
investment and improved organizational efficiency.76 
Finally, the trends in Venezuela suggest that increased employment protection did not 
affect labour market operation in the expected way. In the recession after the labour reform the 
employment-output elasticity was higher than in the pre reform downturn, in spite of the 
tightening of protection against dismissal, while there was little change in employment-output 
elasticities in the periods of expanding activity (table 4). 
Turning now to the analysis of short-term employment changes in the countries that 
"flexibilized" dismissal and/or contracts, what behavioural patterns are apparent? The expansion 
of manufacturing output in Argentina was accompanied by declining employment (table 4). The 
use of "promoted" temporary employment contracts was rather limited; for instance, it was 
According to a case study of management reactions to changes in legislation, legislative reforms seem not 
to have had substantial effects on business practices; in particular, dismissal decisions were not affected by the 
somewhat higher lay-off costs. The sample consisted of 21 firms; see Romaguera et al. (1995) for more details. 
However, Romaguera et al. (1995) conclude that no intensive process of massive labour substitution was 
ongoing in these years. 
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estimated to have represented only some 1.5% of all new recruitment in the first half of 1994 
(Feldman, 1995). But as manufacturing employment was falling, it would seem that temporary 
workers displaced some workers with open-ended contracts.77 
If we now compare pre and post labour law reform periods of growing manufacturing 
output in Colombia, we see that the value of the employment-output elasticity increased (table 
4) accompanying the loosening of protection. Besides, following the liberalization of fixed term 
contracts, the share of temporary employment augmented (in 1991-92), although to drop once 
again in 1993 to the earlier levels;78 the increase is somewhat surprising, as legislation had 
already been extremely permissive in this respect, and the change in the regulations of contracts 
was relatively minor. The proportion of temporary in wage employment increased more in the 
small than in the larger establishments (Lopez, 1993). While the cost of dismissal was curtailed 
and regulations on lay-offs became less restrictive, small firms ceased to be favoured by a 
reduced compensation in case of individual dismissal, and this factor might be behind the more 
marked increase in the use of temporary contracts in small firms. The parallel growth of 
temporary employment and presumable decrease in the proportion of workers with less than one 
year tenure79 suggest that, despite the cuts on dismissal costs, there was an increasing 
utilization of temporary contracts for longer term positions; such temporary contracts would 
continue to entail less costs for firms than permanent contracts. On the other hand, and 
consistently with the elimination of the reinstatement clause that had applied after 10 years of 
continuous employment in the same firm, the proportion of workers with more than 10 years 
employment seems to have slightly risen.80 
And last, in Peru employment-output elasticities increased in the post reform slowdown 
vis-à-vis the pre reform recession (table 4);81 dismissal regulations were somewhat relaxed and, 
moreover, special and temporary contracts actively promoted. During the period of economic 
expansion employment continued to fall. The jump in temporary employment, from the already 
outstandingly high level of about 40% of private sector wage earners in Lima to some 50% after 
No data on turn-over rates in Argentina exist after 1988, and the structure of job tenure does not appear 
to have changed significantly (on the basis of the household survey, Buenos Aires). On the other hand, the 
proportion of workers that receive not a single one of the benefits to which they are entitled legally did not 
continue to increase between 1991 and 1994, but while this might have plausibly been linked with the greater 
availability of short-term, lower-cost contracts, it rather probably was the result of the stricter control of evasion 
of social security contributions - the principal factor behind the former growth of non registered employment. 
Data are for the three main cities, in Berry and Tenjo (1995). They include the self employed. 
Data in Lopez (1993), but note that only two years (1988 and 1992) are compared. 
According to data for 1988 and 1992 (only partial job tenure distributions are shown) in LOpez (1993). 
Employment and output data are not strictly comparable. The former refer to firms with 100 employees 
and over in Lima, while the latter to output at the national level. 
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the 1991 reforms,82 suggests that most of the new recruitment was made under special flexible 
contracts, and that temporary workers replaced permanent ones. This remarkable increase should 
not surprise, as dismissal legislation, despite the changes introduced, continued to be restrictive 
in international terms. 
Putting all the evidence together, some tentative conclusions may be drawn. First, in 
those countries where a wide range of lower-cost, flexible employment contracts were made 
available to business, or where the use such contracts became less restricted (temporary contracts 
in Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru; maquilas in Ecuador), these new opportunities were 
utilized, but much more so where, as in Peru, dismissal legislation continued to be, despite the 
reform, particularly constricting. In Argentina the use of the new temporary modalities was very 
modest.83 And although there was some, apparently ephemeral, growth in the share of 
temporary employment in Colombia, it was in Peru that the use of temporary work visibly 
increased. In Ecuador, since the law on maquilas was passed in 1990 and up to early 1993, 37 
maquila industries were established, creating close to 3,000 jobs, concentrated in two economic 
activities, textiles and fishing; according to Pita (1993), most maquilas originated in already 
existing enterprises that were attracted by tax and tariff exemptions and lower labour protection. 
Second, changes in legislation seem to have had some influence on business firing 
policies. This at least seems to be true if we compare employment-output elasticities in pre and 
post reform recessions (they fell in Brazil and increased in Peru). Besides, in Colombia, the 
elimination of the reinstatement clause after ten years of employment seems to have been 
followed by a change in dismissal policies that affected the structure of job tenure. 
Finally, recruitment policies might have also been altered. This - with the reservations 
aforementioned - could have been the case in Chile's (where the employment-output elasticity 
declined) and Colombia's (where it became higher) phases of economic expansion. In Brazil, 
the growth of illegal employment and subcontracting after the reform also points to a change in 
recruitment strategies. 
But, irrespective of how well employment adjusted to the short-term changes in output, 
was the overall manufacturing employment performance affected by labour law reforms? Once 
again we look at the comparative employment and output behaviour, before (1981-90) and after 
(1990-93) the labour law reforms, but this time to their average trends (table Both in Chile 
Data from the household survey, Metropolitan Lima (in Verdera, 1995). Figures on temporary workers 
include workers in the trial period. Further, between 1991 and 1994 the share of temporary employment steadily 
rose. 
In fact, employers considered the temporary modalities introduced by 1991 Employment Law to be still 
too constrained, as trade unions had been granted some power of approval. 
In other words, while earlier, to assess the short-term adjustment of employment we examined each 
economic phase's average of annual employment-output elasticities, now we look at the elasticity of each (pre 
and post reform) period's average annual rate of change in output and employment. 
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and Venezuela employment fared better after the tightening of protection, but it did also in 
Colombia, where protection, instead, was relaxed. Employment in the remaining countries fell 
after the reforms, generally continuing an earlier tendency, and in Argentina and Peru this 
occurred in spite of the growth of manufacturing output. The path followed by economic 
transformation, and its impact on investment and productivity growth were, of course, more 
powerful determinants than changes in labour market regulation. In Argentina and Peru, for 
instance, the negative employment performance was primarily associated with the effects of 
economic reforms (trade liberalization combined with domestic currency appreciation) and the 
subsequent restructuring (Marshall, 1994b: Verdera, 1995);85 in Colombia, by contrast, 
manufacturing employment increased after the reform (although more slowly than output), while 
in the 1980s it had declined at a time of output growth: apparently, after 1990 employment in 
non-traditional export manufactures climbed, compensating for job losses elsewhere.86 
Employment trends in manufacturing say only little about unemployment behaviour (table 
6). The unemployment rate is influenced, obviously, by employment changes in all economic 
activities and in the supply of labour, that were not analyzed in this paper. In Colombia, for 
instance, unemployment declined with the contribution of manufacturing and construction 
(Lopez, 1993), while in Argentina it rose sharply as a result of falling labour demand in 
manufacturing, construction and public utilities, among other activities, at a time when the 
labour force was expanding (Marshall, 1994b). A perfunctory inspection of unemployment 
trends, in any case, suggests that nor was the flexibilization of employment protection followed 
by reduced joblessness neither did enhanced protection induce the growth of unemployment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
After 1990 employment protection regimes within South America tended toward greater 
convergence, as in the countries with more stringent protection this was relaxed (such was the 
case of Peru) while in those where protection had been weaker it was strengthened (Brazil and 
Chile). Further, more countries introduced capitalization funds and, albeit limited, 
unemployment insurance schemes. Labour law reforms were generally consistent with the 
broader change in economic growth strategies that swept throughout the region. 
The new opportunities provided by the "flexibilization" of employment contracts and 
introduction of maquila industries seem to have been used by business to replace permanent 
personnel, but not to the same extent in all the countries analyzed. Lay-off strategies seem also 
to have responded to the slackening of dismissal rules. Similarly, there is some indication that 
improvements in the protection against dismissal affected firing and recruitment policies, and 
a hint at an inverse relationship between availability of legal "loopholes", exempted from wage 
85 In the case of Argentina, certain manufacturing activities improved their productivity performance, while 
other industries, unable to compete and reconvert, just closed down. 
86 See LOpez (1993). 
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employment protection, and use of subcontracting and illegal employment practices. Finally, as 
it could be expected, there was no discernible impact of the labour law reforms on the average 
performance of employment, given output trends. 
Were the reforms to employment protection legislation that relaxed the constraints on 
dismissal and facilitated flexible contracts effective instruments for the regulation of the labour 
market? If, on the basis of stretching the tenuous evidence cited, we focus in their immediate 
impact the answer would seem to be positive: dismissals in recessions intensified and there was 
a substitution of temporary for open ended contracts. However, the answer is clearly negative 
if we examine the reform effects on employment creation - the proclaimed purpose of 
"flexibilization": as in other regional context also in South America (with the exception of 
Colombia, a case of hybrid reforms) the curtailment of employment protection was not followed 
by a better employment performance and, if anything, the ensuing expansion of dismissal and 
temporary jobs worked exactly in the opposite direction. 
But the discussion of the labour market effects of reforms to labour legislation was 
confined in this paper to the manufacturing sector. Insufficient information on employment 
trends for activities other than manufacturing makes it difficult if not impossible to analyze the 
impact of labour law reforms on business practices beyond this sector. This, as well as the study 
of workers' behaviour in response to institutional changes - such as the spread of capitalization 
funds, creation of unemployment insurance schemes, and new rules governing dismissal and 
contracts - and of how this molds the supply of labour, over a longer time period, remains open 
to in-depth research. 
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TABLE 4. Employment-output elasticities,* pre and post 
labour law reforms 















post reform 6.12(1990-92) 0.72(1989) 
-0.17(1993) 
Chile pre reform 1.31(1982) 2.40(1983-90) 
post reform -- 1.13(1991-93) 
Colombia pre reform 7.44(1982-83) 0.02(1984-90) 















post reform 1.83(1993) 1.5(1991-92) 
* Elasticities are calculated as averages, for each economic phase, 
of annual elasticities 
Source: own estimates on the basis of annual data in CEPAL (several years). 
TABLE 5. Employment performance before and after the labour law reforms: 
Medium term employment output elasticities* and employment trends** 









Argentina 3.14 -2.2 
Brazil 8.21a 
Chile 0.76 2.6 0.84 5.7 
Colombia -0.29 -1.1 0.56 1.4 
Peru 1.47 -2.2 
Venezuela 0.76 1.6 1.22 4.5 
* Employment output elasticity (EOE) of annual average percentage changes 
in the period 
** Annual average rate of change in the period 
1982-88 and 1989-93, respectively. If data for Sao Paulo (because the employment 
figures for 1985 differ strongly) are used for 1981-87, the EOE is 0.54, and if 1993 
is excluded, EOE for 1989-92 is 1.16 
1992-93 
Source: own estimates on the basis of CEPAL, several years. 
TABLE 6. Unemployment trends 
Selected South American countries 




Argentina 5.6 7.5 7.0 11.2 
Brazil 3.6 4.3 5.8 5.5 
Chile 13.1 6.5 4.9 6.2 
Colombia 13.5 10.5 10.2 9.3 
Ecuador 10.7 6.1 8.9 8.1 
Peru 5.4 8.3 9.4 9.5 
Venezuela 12.1 11.0 8.0 8.9 
a Preliminary figures 
Source: CEPAL. Balance Preliminar de la Economla de America 
Latina y ci Caribe, 1994, No. 556/557, December 1994 (see table 
A.4 for details on areas covered by the unemployment surveys in 
each country and other caveats). 
TABLE A. Unfair and collective dismissal legislation in Canada 
Reinstatement Advance notice Compensation Collective/force majeure 









firms with 50 or niore employees: 
1. 16 weeks notice, 
2. should establish conmiiue&' to 
eliminate or minimize lay-offs 
3. compensation as in unfair 
dismissala 
Provincial after 1 to 6 months 
employment (acc. to 
jurisdiction) from 1 to 
8 weeks,d variable 
according to 
jurisdiction and length 
of service 
I day wage/year 
in Ontario, after 
5 years 
employment 
requirements vary according to 
jurisdiction: 
1. longer advance notice than in 
unfair dismissal (see text) 
2. other requirements (see source) 
3. severance pay in Ontario, after 
5 years employment (higher than 
in unfair dismissal) 
Details are in Employment Standards Legislation in Canada see ibid. for the several situations not to be considered as 
collective lay-offs. 
Composed of employee and employer representatives. 
But special provisos in case of "illegal disniissals" (see ibid.) 
d Manitoba: one pay period. 
Source: Labour Canada, Employment Standards Legislation in Canada, 1993-94, Ottawa. 










Peru (Lima) Colombia (4 main 
metro areas)c 
1990 
up to 3 months 12.0 11.7 16.6 10.0" 15.4 
up to 1 year 24.5 31.2 39.8 27.1" 32.2d 
11 years or more 28.0 20.3 10.5 22.8" 14.1" 
Includes the self employed 
b Excludes domestic service 
Private sector 
Less than 3 months, less than 1 year, and 10 years or more, respectively 
TABLE B2. Distribution of workers according to job tenure in manufacturing (percents) 
Includes the self employed 
Less than 3 months, less than 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, July 1995; Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, Instituto Nacional de EstadIstica 
y Censos (Argentina), SEADE (Brazil); Lopez Castafio (1991); Verdera (1992). 
TABLE C. Turn over rates: separations and hirings 
rate of: Canada Argentina Brazil, Sao Paulo Brazil 
Separations 2.0 (1986) 
4.8 (1988) 
1.3 (mfg 1987) 4.1 (1988) 
3.7 (mfg 1986) 
3.8 (1988) 
3.8 (mfg 1998) 
Hirings 2.3 (1986) 
3.7 (1988) 
-- 3.7 (1990) 
3.0 (mfg 1990) 
3.3 (1990) 
3.2 (mfg 1990) 
Source: Lamaitre et al. 
BoletIn de EstadIsticas 
Trabalho-DL 4923/65. 
(1992); Ninisterio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 










Colombia (4 main 
metro areas) 
1990 
up to 3 months 9.6 10.9 12.4 13.6" 
up to 1 year 21.1 29.2 34.0 33.5" 
11 years or more 33.7 21.2 13.7 18.Ob 
1 year, and 10 years or more, respectively 
